According to some, there is no evidence that Benedict XVI intended to designate distinct realities through a differentiated use of the terms munus and ministerium in his Declaratio of February 11, 2013. Along these lines, it is said that the alternating use of these words can be explained either by the richness or elegance of the Pope’s discursive style, or by his desire to emphasize, in certain passages, the vertical dimension denoted by the word munus –defined as burden–, and in others, the horizontal dimension contained in the word ministerium –understood from the perspective of a service rendered to one’s neighbor–[i].
In the face of such approaches, the first thing we must reply is that linguistic units have their own, objective and socially recognizable meaning, linked to the context in which the respective communication is inserted, and transcendent to the mere will of the sender. To assume that the meaning of words depends entirely on the person who utters them is to deprive semantics of purpose, to wink at the nominalist error and, ultimately, to upset the social and juridical order. Therefore, the terms munus and ministerium, used in the Declaratio, must be approached, not from the nebulous psychological terrain –the subjective intentions of Benedict XVI– but from the linguistic sphere to which they belong –that is, the technical-canonical sphere–.
For our part, we have offered abundant evidence of the (partial) semantic distinction that objectively exists, according to canonical regulations, between munus and ministerium: while ministerium always contains an active dimension, whose meaning is that of function, task, work, service, occupation etc., munus denotes, in addition to the above, a situation of ownership, insofar as it refers to a position or a charge within a certain juridical-administrative structure –thus munus presents a broader semantic spectrum than ministerium–[ii].
Now, even if, to satisfy the skeptics, we were to focus on the specific way in which Benedict XVI decided to structure his Declaratio, we would see how the distinction in question appears there quite clearly explained, and we would therefore corroborate that, in this document, the subjective –the mind of the author– constitutes an adequate reflection of the objective –language and canonical realities–[iii].
Let us recall, in fact, how the Pope:
(i) Immediately after declaring that his strenghts were not fit to administer –exercise– the Petrine munus (the ecclesiastical office or charge of Roman Pontiff) – “vires meas […] non iam aptas esse ad munus Petrinum aeque administrandum”–,
(ii) He specified that this munus (ecclesiastical office or charge), of a spiritual nature, is carried out or executed through four functions/tasks/labors/occupations etc. (ministerium): acting, speaking, suffering and praying –“agendo et loquendo […], patiendo et orando”–, thereby making it clear that the munus is the container, and the ministerium, the contents,
(iii) He then recognized that he lacked the necessary vigor to carry out the first two ministerium mentioned: governing the barque of Saint Peter (acting) –“navem Sancti Petri gubernandam”– and announcing the Gospel (speaking) –“annuntiandum Evangelium” –,
(iv) He then announced, in the final section of the text, his will to continue serving the Holy Church of God with a life dedicated to prayer (that is, to maintain the ministry of prayer) –“etiam in futuro vita orationi dedicata Sanctae Ecclesiae Dei toto ex corde sirvere velim”–,
(v) And, significantly, when specifically pronouncing the “formula of renunciation”, he used, not the term munus, but that of ministerium –“declaro me ministerio Episcopi Romae, Successoris Sancti Petri, […] renuntiare”–[iv].
It is therefore evident that the Declaratio expressed a detachment, not from the ownership of the munus (ecclesiastical office/charge) of Pope, but from the exercise of some of the ministerium (functions) associated with said munus. Put another way: the resignation instrumented in the Declaratio did not have as its object –it did not fall upon– the charge of Roman Pontiff –there has never been a juridical act of resignation from the Pontificate–, so this remained upon Benedict XVI.
In fact, this situation was reaffirmed at the last General Audience of the Pope, held on February 27, 2013[v]. It is quite telling that Benedict alluded to his decision to resign, not from the munus (charge) of Roman Pontiff, or from being the holder of the Papacy, but from “the active exercise of the [Petrine] ministry” –“La mia decisione di rinunciare all'esercizio attivo del ministero […]”–. Furthermore, Benedict stressed that, although he would no longer bear the power of the office to govern the Church, nor would he return to “private life” –to a life of travel, receptions, conferences etc.–, he would remain, in a new way, beside to the Crucified Lord, and without abandoning the Cross, he would remain in the service of prayer, from the very enclosure of Saint Peter[vi]. Note, then, that in addition to referring again to the ministerium which, as he had indicated in his Declaratio, make up the Petrine munus (acting, speaking, suffering and praying), the Pope reaffirmed that he had only detached himself from two of these ministerium (acting and speaking), but not from the remaining two (suffering and praying), and much less from the munus as such.
Now, even though Benedict has presented such a clear distinction between munus and ministerium, and limited the object of his “resignation” to two specific ministerium, there are those who maintain that, in any case, the final phrase of the second paragraph of the Declaratio evidences an unequivocal intention to resign from the Papacy, inasmuch as he announces that “the See of Rome, the See of Saint Peter, will be vacant” –“sedes Romae, sedes Sancti Petri vacet”–, and indicates that a conclave be convened, through those who have the authority, for the election of the new Supreme Pontiff –“et Conclave ad eligendum novum Summum Pontificem ab his quibus competit convocandum esse ”–.
Well, in response to this argument we offer a double reply:
On the one hand, the vacancy of an ecclesiastical office can be understood either from a juridical point of view –vacancy of law: absence of a legitimately appointed holder–, or from a factual point of view –vacancy in fact: when, whether or not the office has a legitimate holder, neither he nor a third party performs the corresponding functions–[vii]. Of course, when Benedict XVI stepped down from the ministerium of governing and preaching, retiring to pray and suffer “in the enclosure of Saint Peter”, the Apostolic See became de facto –but not de iure– vacant –“sedes […] vacet ”– that is, materially empty . For the rest, the phrase according to which a conclave would have to be convoked “for the election of the new Supreme Pontiff” is nothing other than the expression of the result that would be reached, in the practical order, once the date set for the effectiveness of the “resignation” had arrived[viii].
And on the other hand, we must not lose sight of the fact that the de iure vacancy of the Apostolic See, and the valid conduct of the subsequent conclave, would only have occurred in the event that all the structural requirements of the juridical act of resignation from the Pontificate –and in particular the requirement of the object– had been fulfilled. Since this never occurred, the juridical consequences linked to this act could not arise –without a cause, there can be no consequence–, even if they were referred to in a certain way in the Declaratio[ix].
Let us consider, in connection with this last point, the case of a priest who, after receiving the consent of two men to “give and accept one another in an irrevocable covenant”, declared them “husband and husband”. It is evident that, since in such a hypothesis the subjective structural requirement of the juridical-sacramental act of marriage is not fulfilled –that is, the disparity of sexes between the contracting parties–, the corresponding juridical consequence is not destined to arise either, even when it is indicated by the one who presides over the liturgy.
In short, then, the very structure of the Declaratio, its linguistic precisions, its care not to link the “renunciation” to that Petrine munus which had been so clearly differentiated from the corresponding ministerium … everything in the document points, on the one hand, to the preservation of the charge of Roman Pontiff upon Benedict XVI, and on the other, to the announcement of the vicissitudes that the Papacy would face in the immediate future, from a purely factual point of view.
Thus, the objective aspect of the Declaratio allows us to assert –and the subjective aspect does not prevent us–: nulla renuntiatio.
Notes
[ii] Cf. https://www.declarationullarenuntiatio.com/en/post/the-semantic-distinction-between-munus-and-ministerium-in-the-canonical-language; ACOSTA, Estefanía. Benedict XVI: Pope «Emeritus»? Independently published, 2021: pp. 51-55 and 177-185.
[iii] Our position has always been to reject the so-called theory of substantial error, which some traditionalists have built upon canon 188 of the Code of Canon Law (CCD), according to which Benedict XVI would have incurred a substantial error, either on the very concepts of munus and ministerium, or on the nature and intrinsic characteristics of the pontificate. From our point of view, the canonical analysis of the (in)validity of the Declaratio as a juridical act of resignation from the pontificate must be developed under the notion of the “object”, as a structural requirement of every juridical act (cf. canon 124 § 1 ibid.).
[v]https://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/it/audiences/2013/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20130227.html.
[vi] “Non ritorno alla vita privata, a una vita di viaggi, incontri, ricevimenti, conferenze eccetera. Non abbandono la croce, ma resto in modo nuovo presso il Signore Crocifisso. Non porto più la potestà dell’officio per il governo della Chiesa, ma nel servizio della preghiera resto, per così dire, nel recinto di san Pietro. San Benedetto, il cui nome porto da Papa, mi sarà di grande esempio in questo. Egli ci ha mostrato la via per una vita, che, attiva o passiva, appartiene totalmente all’opera di Dio”.
[vii] See canons 153-154 of the CDC, and their respective commentary, in: CÓDIGO DE DERECHO CANÓNICO. 6ª ed. Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra S.A., 2001.
[viii] The apparent redundancy in the phrase “sedes Romae, sedes Sancti Petri vacet” is striking –of course, the See of Rome is the See of Saint Peter–. It is inevitable to refer at this point to the prophetic message of La Salette: “Rome will lose the faith and become the See of the anti-Christ”. It truly seems that, after the Declaratio and the subsequent “conclave” of March 2013, Rome has ceased to be the See of Peter, the See of faith (cf. Mt 16: 15-19, Lk 22: 31-32, Jn 21: 15-17, St. Clement I, St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Irenaeus of Lyon etc.), and has become the opposite.
[ix] It is interesting to note the parallelism that exists between “the new Supreme Pontiff” elected after the Declaratio and the merely apparent authority that the Jewish High Priests retained (cf. Acts 23:5) after they rejected Christ as Savior and “their house” (Jerusalem) was consequently left empty, deserted, abandoned (Lk 13: 35).
